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THE DISPARITY IN TREATMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CUSTODY DISPUTES IN
AMERICAN COURTS:
A POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH ANALYSIS
Lexi Maxwellt
INTRODUCTION:
In recent years, as a result of the growing divorce rate in
the United States and the increasingly progressive attitude of
American judges in advocating shared custody, judicial activism
in custody arrangements has begun to play an important role in
the lives of many Americans. In addition, due to the increasing
mobility of the global population, many custody disputes that
enter the American judicial system transcend international
boundaries. This results in complicated situations for United
States district and state court judges who are tasked with issu-
ing fair and equitable custody decrees on a regular basis while
also being faced with the reality of the potential inequality in
international custody awards based on a parent's home country.
Many nations, including the United States, have banded to-
gether in an attempt to encourage the resolution of custody dis-
putes that cross international boarders. The Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction1 [herein-
after Hague Convention] is one such international effort, which
attempts to reserve substantive custody decisions exclusively
for the court that has jurisdiction in the habitual residence of a
t J.D., Pace University School of Law. The author would like to thank Prof.
Michael Mushlin for his generous contribution of time as well as his many
thoughtful comments.
1 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
opened for signature Oct. 25, 1980 T.I.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered
into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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particular child. 2 The Hague Convention was ratified in 1980,
and enacted into the United States body of law by Congress, in
an attempt to de-complicate signatory nations' judicial proce-
dure when faced with parents fighting for custody across inter-
national borders.3 The Convention was also designed to protect
one parent when the other parent is seeking a custody decrees
from his or her home country4. Under this agreement, the sig-
natory nations mutually assist each other in ensuring that only
one local court has jurisdiction over the substantive custody de-
cisions of a child, even when the child's parents reside in two
separate countries. 5
Not all countries are signatories to the Hague Convention.6
International custody disputes can become more complicated
and discretionary for a judge who is trying to act in the best
interest of the child when the home state of the parent is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention. In these cases, the judge
must consider the realities that if a child is sent to a foreign
non-Hague country, even for visitation 7, the child is outside
American jurisdiction and the American judicial system cannot
protect the return of a child to his or her American parent in the
event that the foreign parent chooses to disobey the American
order. There is also a possibility that the foreign parent may
obtain a conflicting custody decree from a foreign court.8 Be-
cause American courts are not bound by any particular conven-
tion, their decisions on whether a U.S. court has jurisdiction
over a custody determination are remarkably different from
those concerning Hague signatories, reflecting a trend that
judges are less willing to give a child to a foreign court for a
substantive custody determination, absent a compelling rea-
son.9 These so called compelling reasons are not uniform
among U.S. domestic jurisdictions because state courts handle
2 Id.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Hosain v. Malik, 672 A.2d 988 (Ct. Sp. App. Md. 1996),(where the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland had to rule on whether or not to accept a
custody order from Pakistan, which is not a Hague signatory).
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Al-Safran v. Al-Safran, No. 27823-5-I 2003, WL 21387188, at *5
(Wash. App. June 17, 2003) (where the Court of Appeals of Washington held that
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substantive custody decisions. However, the state judicial
trends have been to keep substantive custody determinations in
the U.S. unless a court is confident that the case belongs in a
foreign country and the foreign court will apply a standard com-
parable to the U.S. best interest standard in custody
determinations. 10
In recent years, domestic courts have effectively dealt with
international custody disputes involving Hague countries, but
have been hesitant to decline jurisdiction in custody cases in-
volving non-Hague countries.1" Since September 11th, some
U.S. courts are wary of returning a child to a non-Hague coun-
try for a substantive custody determination, even if the country
is the habitual residence of a child, which, under a Hague sce-
nario, would require the U.S. court to decline jurisdiction over
the case.' 2 However, courts have been comfortable in allowing
visitation in non-Hague countries if a judge determines that a
child will be ensured a safe return to the U.S.' 3 Regardless,
U.S. courts treat parents residing in non-Hague countries dif-
ferently from those who live in Hague countries because there is
no standard protocol for these custody decrees. 14 This is espe-
cially problematic because state courts are making substantive
custody decisions in non-Hague matters, where federal courts
are merely screening the appropriateness of jurisdiction for
Hague-signatories before state courts can assume jurisdiction. 15
Part II of this paper will contain a general history of the
Hague Convention. It will include a general history of the U.S.
courts' treatment of custody disputes involving countries that
the mere fact that a parent was requesting visitation in a non-Hague nation, such
as Kuwait, was enough to prevent visitation).
10 Contrast id. with Long v. Ardestani, 624 N.W.2d 405, 414 (Wis. Ct. App
2001) (where the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that a mother failed to show a
compelling reason why her children should be prevented from visiting Iran, a non-
Hague signatory nation, with their father).
11 See Hosain, 672 A.2d 988; see also, Paz v. Mejia De Paz, 169 F. Supp. 2d
254, 259 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (holding that a child's habitual residence was New York
which required that a custody dispute be resolved in New York rather than New
Zealand).
12 See Al-Safran, 2003 WL 21387188, at *5.
13 See Long, 624 N.W.2d at 414.
14 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, at art. 14-16 (which does not provide
for federal review of international custody disputes concerning non-Hague
signatories).
15 See Al-Safran, 2003 WL 21387188, at *5.
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subscribe to the Hague Convention. Part III will provide an
overview, with examples from various U.S. jurisdictions, of U.S.
courts' treatments of custody disputes involving non-Hague sig-
natories. It will also evaluate the adjudicative process absent
any binding international law or convention. Part IV will state
the conclusion that international custody disputes that do not
fall under the Hague Convention could be more fairly adjudi-
cated in American courts.
In conclusion, despite legitimate concerns, it is clear that
U.S. courts must equalize and adopt more uniform treatment of
custody disputes involving Hague and non-Hague countries.
Some recent decisions, such as the New Jersey Supreme Court's
approval of parental visitation in Lebanon (a non-Hague signa-
tory)16, should be applied in all state jurisdictions. The primary
focus of the judges should be on the best interest of the child
and courts should work creatively with non-Hague situations to
allow visitation if it is the just resolution to the custody dispute.
This method of awarding custody in non-Hague countries, with
safeguards for enforcement, is preferred over abuses of jurisdic-
tion in which a child is forced to remain in the U.S. Clearly,
many countries will not adopt the Hague Convention. There-
fore, American courts continue to suggest through their hold-
ings that in order to safeguard the rights of Americans, custody
disputes must be adjudicated in the U.S. However, even in re-
taining jurisdiction, U.S. courts should not totally reject the
idea of visitation in the non-Hague countries if safeguards for
return are implemented.
PART II
The Hague Convention was adopted at the Hague on Octo-
ber 6, 1980 by 36 countries. 17 The United States ratified the
Convention on April 29, 1988.18 Congress enacted the Interna-
tional Child Abduction Remedies Act to implement the ratified
Convention.' 9 The Hague Convention came to fruition in order
16 See generally Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 824 A. 2d 268 (N.J. 2003).
17 Hague Convention, supra note 1.
18 Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of International
Child Abduction Remedies Act, 125 A.L.R Fed. 217 (1995).
19 Hague Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
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to address a variety of important international policy concerns.
Chapter I, Article 1 of the Convention states that:
the. objects of the present Convention are - a. To secure the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in
any Contracting State; and b. To ensure that rights of custody
and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effec-
tively respected in the other Contracting States.20
In order to accomplish this goal, Article 2 reads that
"[ciontracting states shall take all appropriate measures to se-
cure within their territories the implementation of the objects of
the Convention." 21 In order to assess where a child's rightful
custody should be decided, under Article 4, the Convention
holds that "the convention shall apply to any child who was ha-
bitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any
breach of custody or access rights."22 In order to implement the
removal to the proper state, each signatory must, under Article
6, appoint a central authority in charge of this matter.23 Sec-
tion b of Article 6 further outlines that the process of discerning
habitual residence includes a consideration of a child's social
background. 24
Under Article 13, the only situations in which a domestic
court can opt not to return a child to his or her place of habitual
residence are where it discerns the requesting parent was not
actually exercising custody rights or where there is a grave risk
in returning the child to that situation.25 Thus, under Article
14 of the Hague Convention, domestic trial judges have no dis-
cretion in international custody disputes unless it is clear that
the particular court should rightly have jurisdiction over the
substantive matter of the case.26 This policy of restraint in
jump starting the judicial process in an international custody
dispute until habitual residency is determined is crystalized in
Article 16:
20 Id. at art. 1.
21 Id. at art. 2.
22 Id. at art. 4.
23 Hague Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6.
24 Id. at art. 7(d).
25 Id. at art. 13.
26 Id. at art. 14.
20051
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The judicial or administrative authorities of the contracting state
to which the child has been removed or in which it has been re-
tained shall not decide on the merits of rights or custody until it
has been determined that the child is not to be returned under
this convention or unless an application under this convention is
not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of this
notice. 2 7
This article clearly states that a custody trial on the merits is
unlawful unless it has first been determined that a child should
not be returned to the residence of the other parent. Thus, the
Hague Convention is set up in a manner to easily facilitate the
transfer of children between signatory countries during custody
disputes. This Convention does not speak to substantive law,
but rather it is a mechanism for selecting the proper jurisdic-
tion to settle substantive custody issues.
On August 11th, 1988, President Ronald Reagan desig-
nated the United States Department of State as the central au-
thority of the U.S., for purposes of enforcement of the Hague
Convention. 28 Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12645, those
filing a claim in the U.S. concerning an international custody
dispute could apply to the central authority or initiate a pro-
ceeding in federal district or state court.29 Since the enactment
of this system, when a domestic U.S. court is faced with an in-
ternational custody dispute, it is required to follow the simply
laid out guidelines of where to send the dispute. 30 Substantive
custody decisions are thereby reserved for American courts only
where the United States has been the habitual residence of the
child.3 1 In some instances, American courts have held that they
lacked jurisdiction in international custody disputes involving
Hague countries.3 2 Thus, American courts are able to screen
out international custody disputes if a child is not a habitual
resident of the United States.
27 Id. at art. 16.
28 Smith, supra note 18.
29 Id.
30 Hague Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Aldinger v. Selger, 263 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D.P.R. 2003) (holding that
a child's habitual residence was Germany, and, therefore, the US courts did not
have jurisdiction over the matter).
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For example, in Wiggill v. Jakicki,33 the US District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia held that, under the
Hague Convention, Federal Courts cannot enforce parental
rights of access if there is no "wrongful removal" of a child.34
Here, the mother states that the British father has the right of
custody and that she is only seeking visitation during the sum-
mer months. 35 The court stated that "while federal courts un-
doubtedly have jurisdiction under the Convention and ICARA
to act where children have been wrongfully removed from their
country of habitual residence, that jurisdiction does not extend
to access issues and alleged breaches of access rights."36 There-
fore, the international custody dispute concerning the parental
right of access of a British parent was dismissed in Federal
Court. The reasoning for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was
because it failed to qualify for jurisdiction under the Hague
Convention. 37
In addition, an extensive examination of recent U.S. court
decisions concerning international custody disputes falling
under the Hague Convention evidences the fact that courts
have been able to apply this Convention with ease concerning
jurisdictional issues38 in that they do not make substantive cus-
tody decisions in instances where a child is not a habitual resi-
dent of the United States. 39 The most simple illustration of the
Hague Convention protections is illustrated in Aldinger v.
Segler.40 In Aldinger, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico made the determination that a child's habitual resi-
dence was Germany. 4 1 This fact determined that the child
should be returned there for a custody determination on the
merits.42 In fact, the parties stipulated that the children's ha-
bitual place of residence was Germany.43 Thus, the only issue
to determine was whether Aldinger forfeited his custody rights
33 Wiggill v. Janicki, 262 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. W. Va. 2003)
34 Id. at 688.
35 Id. at 689.
36 Id.
37 Wiggill, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
38 Aldinger, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 284.
41 Id. at 287.
42 Id. at 289.
43 Id.
2005]
7
PACE INT'L L. REV.
in the marriage contract.44 The court reasoned that its role "is
limited to the procedural and jurisdictional issues addressed by
the Convention, and a determination of the ultimate merits of
any custody dispute between the parties is beyond that narrow
procedural and jurisdictional landscape." 45 It would be up to a
German court to make substantive custody decisions. 46 Thus,
under the Hague Convention, when America is not a child's ha-
bitual residence, the clear role of a United States District Court
judge in international custody disputes is limited to purely pro-
cedural issues pertaining to jurisdiction.
This simple analysis, where a U.S. district court is limited,
under the Hague Convention, to procedural determinations, is
also evident in Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandez.47 In
Antunez-Fermandes, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa reviewed a Hague Convention petition. Here,
the plaintiff sought the return of children who were removed by
the mother from France to the United States. 48 The court ex-
amined where the children habitually resided, and found their
residence to be France. 49 Additionally, since there was no grave
risk of harm to the children, the court held that the U.S. had no
jurisdiction in the matter. 50 This case is a clear illustration of
the effectiveness of the Hague Convention in resolving interna-
tional custody disputes involving signatory nations. If an inter-
national custody issue arises, a U.S. district court would not
look to decide the case on the merits unless it has first found
that the U.S. is the child's habitual residence. 51 As seen
through the holding in Croll v. CrollJ 5 2, a pre-September 11th
decision, U.S. district courts have applied this rule consistently
since the signing of the Hague Convention. 53 Here, the court
held that since the child was a habitual resident of another
44 Aldinger, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
45 Id. at 289.
46 Id.
47 Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Iowa
2003).
48 Id. at 806.
49 Id. at 807.
50 Id. at 810.
51 See Aldinger, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 284; see also Antunez-Fernandez, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 800.
52 Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
53 Id. at 143-44.
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Hague signatory country, Hong Kong, a U.S. district court was
not authorized to rule regarding rights of access. 54
A slightly more complicated twist on this formula is exem-
plified in Silverman v. Silverman,55 where the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota ruled in a custody dispute
involving an Israeli father that an Israeli court had jurisdiction
to decide the substantive custody issue.56 Because Israel was
the habitual residence of the children, as soon as the Israeli
courts reached an order, the children had to be removed to that
country as a Hague nation.57 The court took this position even
after a Minnesota court also decided the case on the merits and
concluded that the children would be best off in the care of their
mother in America. 58 This decision illustrates the fact that
when presented with a situation where a child is a habitual res-
ident of a foreign country, U.S. federal courts cannot allow a
domestic custody decree to stand.59 The court could legally hold
that the child remain in the United States pending a custody
determination in Israel, but could not rule as to any substantive
custody issues60 .
McKenzie v. McKenzie is another case where the court held
that, under the Hague Convention, U.S. courts can only decide
jurisdiction in international custody disputes.61 In this case,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
held that, under the Hague Convention, a court may determine
whether a child can be returned to another country, but cannot
address the substantive issues of the custody dispute. 62 In this
case, the court defined the term "habitual residence" as more of
a state of being rather than a specific period of time.63 The
court found that this child had spent nearly a year in the U.S.,
but was not convinced that the child's habitual residence had
54 Id.
55 Silverman v. Silverman, No. Civ. 00-2274 2003, WL 22076555 (D. Minn.
Aug. 28, 2003).
56 Id. at *3.
57 Id.
58 Id. at *2.
59 Id. at *2-*3.
60 Id. at *3.
61 McKenzie v. McKenzie, 168 F. Supp. 2d 47 (E.D.N.Y 2001).
62 Id. at 49.
63 Id. at 50-51.
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shifted from Germany. 64 Therefore, the court abstained from
ruling on the merits of the case. 65 In its decision, the court
looked to the definition of habitual residence as seen in Brooke
v. Willis, 66 stating that the place of habitual residence "is deter-
mined more by a state of being than by any specific period of
time... [and] can be established after only one day as long as
there is some evidence that the child has become 'settled' into
the location in question."67 Therefore, as illustrated through
the abovementioned cases, if a court concludes that a child has
an affiliation that is stronger with one nation, but currently re-
sides in another country, the court must still hold that more
tightly connected country as the child's habitual residence. 68
The country of habitual residence is then charged with substan-
tive custody determinations associated with the child.69
The interplay between the federal and state court systems
is also laid out in Article 6 of the Hague Convention, which dic-
tates that each state appoint a particular enforcement agency
for the convention. 70 Federal courts have jurisdiction over
Hague disputes; traditional substantive custody disputes, how-
ever, must be resolved in state court.71 Therefore, if a parent
seeks a custody decree involving solely American parties in the
U.S., he will pursue this goal through the state court system.
However, in international custody disputes, a state court may
not reach a substantive decision on the merits of the case if a
parent raises a Hague Convention objection.7 2 Rather, a state
court must defer its decision until a federal court resolves the
objection.7 3 This safeguard, which attempts to eliminate con-
flicting international custody orders, is implemented through
the federal court system.74
64 Id. at 50.
65 Id.
66 Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y 1995).
67 McKenzie, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (quoting Brook v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57,
61 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
68 Id.
69 Hague Convention, supra note 1, at art. 6.
70 Id.
71 42 U.S.C.A § 11601(b)(4) (2003).
72 See generally id.
73 Id.
74 Antunez-Fernandes, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
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Holder v. Holder illustrates that, under the Hague Conven-
tion, there is a designated interaction between federal and state
courts, which results in different substantive roles for each. 75
In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington to stay a Hague action for removal to
Germany. 76 At the time of the Hague action, a California state
court was ruling on the divorce proceedings on the merits. 77
The father was stationed with the U.S. Air Force in Germany.7 8
After a trip to California, the mother refused to return to Ger-
many with the children.7 9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the district court abused its discretion in
staying the Hague action.80 Although the father filed in Califor-
nia state court, he did not waive his Hague rights solely because
he failed to mention any Hague claims in his California claim.8 1
Under Section 11603 of the Hague Convention, there is a clear
rule that federal courts adjudicating Hague Convention peti-
tions should accord full faith and credit to judgments of state or
federal courts that had completed proceedings on the merits.8 2
Accordingly, Federal courts should only examine whether it is
appropriate that custody be decided in the US rather than rul-
ing on the substance of the decision.8 3 Under this reasoning,
this court found that it is illogical to conclude that a Hague Con-
vention claim would be barred in federal court because the
Hague Convention was not raised in that state case.84 Due to
the Hague Convention, the federal court system was able to eas-
ily adjudicate the rights of parents during an international cus-
tody dispute.8 5
In addition to challenges to local custody decrees in federal
courts, state appellate courts have also reviewed and reversed
75 Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2002)
76 Id. at 859.
77 Id. at 861-2.
78 Id. at 860.
79 Id. at 860.
80 Holder, 305 F.3d at 867.
81 Id. at 867.
82 Id. at 863.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 864.
85 Id. at 873.
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trial court custody decisions8 6 when lower state courts do not
have proper jurisdiction as a child's habitual residence.8 7 In In
re Jude L. Vernor,8 8 the Court of Appeals of Texas held that the
Texas trial court inappropriately assumed jurisdiction in decid-
ing the custody issue on the merits.8 9 The lower court had
handed down a temporary order following a paternity and cus-
tody trial, requiring the mother to return the child to from Aus-
tralia to Texas within 11 days.90 The father then initiated an
application for the return of the child under the Hague Conven-
tion in the family court of Melbourne, Australia.91 However, in
that proceeding, the father failed to mention that the temporary
order naming him as a joint managing conservator and restrict-
ing the child's residence to Texas had been dismissed years ear-
lier.92 The court concluded that the child was living in Texas at
the time of the child's removal to Australia, but the father had
no custodial rights under Texas law. 93 Therefore, the appellate
court held that the mother's removal of the child from Australia
was not a violation under the Hague Convention.94
In making its assessment that the trial court erred in con-
cluding that the father properly evoked the Hague convention,
the Court of Appeals used the following system of analysis:
[whether a parent:](1) had 'rights of custody' of the child at the
time of the removal of the child and was exercising those rights;
(2) the child was removed from the child's habitual residence; and
(3) the removal breached the applicant's 'rights of custody'. 9 5
Here, a state appellate court, rather than a federal district
court, had jurisdiction to rule that the child's habitual residence
was, in fact, Texas.96 Because the child was not wrongfully re-
moved from Texas, as his father had no custodial rights under
Texas law, the father was not entitled to an order of return from
86 See In re Jude L. Vernor, 94 S.W.3d 201 (Tx. Ct. App. 2003).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 209.
90 In re Jude L. Vernor, 94 S.W.3d at 206.
91 Id. at 204-05.
92 Id. at 204.
93 Id. at 209.
94 Id.
95 In re Jude L. Vernon, 94 S.W.3d at 209.
96 See id.
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Australia.9 7 This conclusion stands irrespective of any later as-
sertion of custodial rights in a Texas state court.98 Thus, the
provisions of the Hague Convention, which attempt to prevent
simultaneously competing custody orders, can be implemented
by federal courts or through the appellate system of any partic-
ular state.99
U.S. courts have been guided in their custody decisions by
the exceptions provided for in the Hague Convention, which al-
low a non-habitual residence jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction
over a substantive custody decision.100 One such exception is
an evocation concerning the enumerated exception in the con-
vention of grave risk of harm to a child. 10 1 Article 13(b) of the
Hague Convention lifts the requirement that a custody dispute
be determined in the country of habitual residence if a showing
is made that the child would face a grave risk of harm if he or
she was returned to that country for a substantive custody de-
termination. 10 2 It is clear, however, that some U.S. courts are
cautious in their acceptances of this exception as a valid means
of retaining substantive jurisdiction in custody disputes. 103 In
Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro,104 the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan was presented with the issue of
whether a return to a custodial parent in the Netherlands
presented a grave risk of harm to a child. 105 In this case, the
mother, a Dutch citizen living in the Netherlands, had legal
custody of her two children pursuant to an Arizona divorce de-
cree.10 6 Thus, the initial custody determination was made by
an American state court, which granted primary custody to the
mother in the Netherlands. When the children were in the US
97 In re Jude L. Vernon, 94 S.W. 3d at 211.
98 Id.
99 See also Paz, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concerning a father's
filing of a Hague request that child be returned to his custody in New Zealand from
New York, with federal district judge holding that child's habitual residence was
now New York, and, therefore, the custody dispute should be resolved in New York
rather than New Zealand).
100 Hague Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13.
101 Id. at art. 13(b).
102 Id.
103 See Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
104 See id. at 954.
105 Id. at 957
106 Id. at 954.
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for scheduled visitation, one allegedly refused to re-board the
plane. 107 Because the child feared returning home where he
was constantly left home alone by his stepfather, his father de-
cided to retain the children.'0 8 The mother subsequently filed
this action to bring her children back to the Netherlands. 10 9
The court held that this information was sufficient evidence of
lack of grave harm to grant summary judgment in favor of the
mother."10 The court applied the definition promulgated in
Friedrich"" for grave harm, stating that there was no genuine
issue of material fact that a return to the Netherlands would be
"'tantamount to a zone of war, famine, or disease' .... or that the
family was 'incapable or unwilling to give that child adequate
protection."1" 2 The court concluded that a grave risk did not ex-
ist, and, therefore had no reason to retain jurisdiction. 1 3 Thus,
the court failed to find an imminently harmful and dangerous
situation for the children upon return to the Netherlands, de-
termining that substantive custody disputes must be resolved
in the Netherlands. 1 4 Once again, the provisions of the Hague
Convention guided the court in its decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the mother and required a return to the
Netherlands for the children.
The above examples illustrate where the Hague Conven-
tion has dictated that US courts not have jurisdiction over cer-
tain international custody disputes. In addition to restricting
the power of U.S. courts in hearing international custody dis-
putes, the Hague Convention has also effectively conferred ju-
risdiction to U.S. state courts in making substantive custody
decisions where a child was a habitual resident of the United
States. Because the Hague Convention criteria were used in as-
sessing the appropriateness of asserting jurisdiction, no inter-
national battles ensued concerning the validity of those
domestic custody decisions. For example, in Ron v. Levi, " 5 the
107 Raigamakers-Eghaghe, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 955-56.
111 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).
112 Raigamakers-Eghaghe, 131 F. Supp 2d at 957.
113 Id. at 957.
114 Id.
115 Ron v. Levi, 279 A.D. 2d 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York held that,
since the father failed to prove that his children were not habit-
ual residents of any country other than the US, they could not
be taken to Israel for a substantive custody determination. 11 6
The court held that the children were born in Israel and were
Israeli citizens but had spent relatively equal amounts of time
in the United States and Israel. 117 Thus, because there was no
plan for the children to return to Israel, the Supreme Court of
New York's dismissal of the Hague Convention action was en-
tirely appropriate, as New York was the clear habitual resi-
dence, and the case was rightfully adjudicated according to New
York state law.' 18 Because both Israel and the U.S. were
Hague signatories, once the U.S. asserted jurisdiction, the in-
ternational battles for a custody forum were over."19
Under the Hague Convention, state courts, once they estab-
lish legal jurisdiction under the Hague criteria, may customize
particular custody orders by, for example, safeguarding a child's
return to the US even if visitation is awarded in another Hague
country. 120 In Charpie v. Charpie,'2 1 the Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division of New York, upheld a trial court custody order
requiring a father to deposit funds in escrow when he traveled
with his children to Switzerland. 122 Because New York was the
children's habitual residence, its courts had sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over this action and were able to insist on and en-
force safeguards to protect the children. 23 In light of Septem-
ber 11th and the father's continuing threats to remove his
children permanently to Switzerland, and because the father
failed to persuade the New York court that spending a year in
Switzerland was in the children's best interest, the court found
116 Id. at 862.
117 Id. at 366-67.
118 See also Escafv. Rodriguez, 52 Fed. Appx. 207 (4th Cir. 2002)(holding that
because Colombia was the habitual residence of the child, he had been wrongfully
retained in the United States); See also Paz, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59 (holding
that a child's living in New Zealand was only meant to be temporary and therefore
his custody dispute should be adjudicated in the U.S.).
119 Paz, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 958-59.
120 See Charpie v. Charpie, 752 N.Y.S.2d 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 293.
123 Id.
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it appropriate to allow visitation with collateral. 124 Since the
New York court had substantive jurisdiction, as it was the ha-
bitual residence of the children, the New York state courts had
the authority to insert this provision concerning international
travel into the custody decree.
Since September 11th, state courts have also asserted juris-
diction in situations where a U.S. court has personal jurisdic-
tion over only one party, the child is a habitual resident of the
U.S., and the case arises with another Hague signatory. 125 In
Spindler v. Mayol,' 26 the District Court of Appeals of Florida
decided a case in which a husband had removed his child from
Florida to Brazil. 127 Despite the fact that process was not
served on the father in compliance with Florida law or under
the Hague Convention, the state court affirmed most of the di-
vorce and custody judgment. 128 It reasoned that Florida was
the home state of the child, the paramount criteria for substan-
tive decision-making under the Hague Convention, and was,
therefore, allowed to make custody decisions in the matter
under the Hague Convention.' 29 Because the Hague Conven-
tion specifically discusses custody disputes that fall across in-
ternational borders, the Florida courts were not paralyzed in
their ability to resolve the matter for the child who was found to
be a habitual resident of Florida. This custody dispute was han-
dled without controversy in Florida, under Hague, irrespective
of the fact that the father tried to shield himself in Brazil.
PART III
The Hague System of establishing a child's habitual resi-
dence and conferring exclusive jurisdiction for substantive cus-
tody decisions only in that jurisdiction works well for
international custody disputes that fall within the Hague con-
vention. However, U.S. courts are left in the dark in terms of
statutory guidance when dealing with disputes involving an
American parent and a parent seeking custody or visitation in a
124 Id.
125 Spindler v. Mayol, 849 So.2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1103.
128 Id. at 1104-05.
129 Id.
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non-Hague signatory nation or where that parent has also
availed himself or herself of that nation's court system simulta-
neously with the American parent's filing for custody in an
American court.1 30 One primary reason for the troubles facing
U.S. judges is a judge's necessary practical consideration that
even if a U.S. court asserts substantive jurisdiction in a custody
dispute with a non-Hague resident, its holding could become
worthless if a child is removed to that other country, as the U.S.
would have no enforcement mechanism over its decree.' 3 '
Since September 11th, American judges have become in-
creasingly wary of declining the right to adjudicate substantive
custody decisions that involve a party who is a resident of a
non-Hague country. This judicial skepticism has also grown re-
garding visitation in non-Hague countries as the number of
"anti-American" non-Hague signatory nations and judicial bod-
ies have grown and those which already existed have become
increasingly stronger in anti-American sentiment. 32 Because
there is no determinative treaty between the U.S. and Islamic
nations, American state judges have the authority, which they
seem to be using, to rule in a non-uniform way relating to treat-
ment of custody decrees issued by Islamic countries.' 33 U.S.
courts have established a pattern, since the enactment of the
Hague Convention, of finding ways to keep custody disputes
that do not fall under the Hague protection in US courts. This
pattern has strengthened since September 11th and it has re-
sulted in a policy of reluctance to extend comity to these non-
Hague countries. 34
For example, a Maryland Court of Special Appeals 1996
case, Hosain v. Malik, '5 illustrates the tradition of American
130 Treatment of non-Hague signatories in international custody disputes is
not accounted for under the Hague Convention. Thus, the only guidance comes
from the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993, when a child is
abducted from the U.S. to a non-Hague country. See 18 U.S.C. § 1204.
131 Hague Convention, supra note 1.
132 See, e.g., Ahmed v. Naviwala, 762 N.Y.S. 2d 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
133 Thomas Foley, Extending Comedy to Foreign Decrees in International Cus-
tody Disputes between Parents in the United States and Islamic Nations, 41 FAM.
CT. REV. 257, 257 (2003).
134 Id.
135 Hosain, 671 A.2d 988; see also, June Starr, The Global Battlefield: Culture
and International Child Custody Disputes at Century's End, 15 ARIZ. J. INV'L &
CoMP. L. 791, 810 (Fall 1998).
2005]
17
PACE INT'L L. REV[
courts only allowing disputes to be settled in non-Hague coun-
tries if those nations follow American standards. 136 The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland ruled that since the Pakistan
court applied the best interest of the child test in its custody
decision, the Pakistani orders were not contrary to American
law or public policy and were entitled to comity. 137 This pre-
September 11th decision illustrates the fact that an American
court has the ability to remove substantive custody disputes to
non-Hague countries if it feels that the standards of the other
nations are not contrary to American law and policy. 138
An analysis of recent U.S. courts' treatment in custody de-
crees of parents from non-Hague countries shows a trend con-
cerning international custody disputes. This pattern points
towards courts not denying visitation to those countries merely
because travel to a non-Hague country is involved. For exam-
ple, in 2001, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held in Long v.
Ardestani that it was in the children's best interest to travel
with their father to Iran. 139 The court found that the mother
had a burden to prove that taking the children to a non-Hague
country was not in the best interest of the children under those
particular circumstances.1 40 This conclusion was reached de-
spite the fact that, not only is Iran not a Hague signatory, but it
is also a country that bases its law on the Koran, under which a
mother is only entitled to custody of small children.' 41 The
mother had a legitimate fear that if these children were brought
to Iran, they would not return. 42 However, under the particu-
lar circumstances of this case, the court concluded that it was
not proper to infer that the father did not intend to return to the
U.S. with his children. 43 In fact, the court refused to adopt a
rule of law that states that travel to non-Hague countries
should be prohibited because of enforcement concerns. 44
136 Hosain, 671 A.2d at 991.
137 Id. at 990.
138 Id. at 1010-11.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 414.
141 Id. at 408.
142 Id.
143 Long, 624 N.W. 2d at 417.
144 Id. at 418.
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Rather, each case should be considered as to whether a risk is
formed in traveling to a non-Hague country. 145
Since September 11th, courts have attempted to find other
mechanisms to secure rights for American parents in interna-
tional custody disputes involving non-Hague nations. 46 In
stark contrast to the Long decision, in 2003, the Court of Ap-
peals of Washington, in Al-Safran v. Al-Safran,147 held in that
the mere fact that a parent was requesting visitation in a non-
Hague nation, such as Kuwait, was enough to prevent this visi-
tation from occurring. 148 The court holds that there is no
proper enforcement mechanism for children outside of the
Hague Convention and, therefore, visitation may not occur. 149
In contrast Long, decided prior to September 11th, this court
holds that it does not matter whether the non-Hague parent has
exhibited any behavior that would suggest that the child would
not be returned. 150 Therefore, some courts have become ex-
tremely wary of allowing a child to travel to one of these non-
Hague countries because the court fears that if the child is not
returned to the U.S., the American legal system will not be able
to aid in the child's return and American parents will be with-
out a legal remedy in the non-Hague country. 51 In addition, if
a child is removed to one of these countries, the risk is run that
a parent might seek a different custody decree from the non-
Hague nation that is not required to abide by the US orders.- 52
Another one of these mechanisms is a consistent finding by
courts that the best interest of a child cannot involve travel to a
non-Hague country like Saudi Arabia. In Ahmed v. Naviwala,
the Supreme Court, Appellate division of New York, made this
ruling after a wrongful removal.1 53 The ruling came despite a
previous agreement by the parents, the desires of the children,
and the recommendation of the guardian that custody should be
145 Id. at 417.
146 Id. at 417 (with the court holding it believed that the father had a great
enough interest to return the children to the United States).
147 Al-Safran v. Al-Safran, No. 27823-5-I 2003, WL 21387188 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 17, 2003).
148 Id. at *5.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Al-Safran, 2003 WL 21387188, at *5.
152 Id.
153 Ahmed v. Naviwala, 762 N.Y.S. 2d 125, 128 (2003).
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split.'-5 In addition, the mother, as sole custodian, was
awarded full control of the children's passports. 155 This hap-
pened after the father took the children to Saudi Arabia and
immediately sought a Saudi custody decree, which he re-
ceived.1 56 The court justified its decision based on the fact that
Saudi Arabia was not a Hague signatory, and therefore, the fa-
ther could go to this country and get his own custody decree and
U.S. courts would have no authority to remedy the situation
once the children were removed. 57 Because there was a willful
interference with this parent's custodial rights, there is a suffi-
cient change in circumstances as to deem the old order was in-
consistent with the best interest of the children and terminate
visitation to the non-Hague country.158
The International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993,
which was passed by Congress to create a remedy for the situa-
tion of wrongful removal, can be used by a court as an alterna-
tive to outright denial of visitation.15 9 Many parents charged
under this act have attempted, even before September 11th, to
present the affirmative defense that they were acting under a
foreign custody decree or according to religious convictions that
would not be respected in U.S. courts. 160 However, even before
September 11th, U.S. courts were extremely cautious in ac-
knowledging this as a valid defense.' 61 Since September 11th,
courts have increasingly made use of this act to close the en-
forcement gap with non-Hague convention signatories. 62 For
example, in U.S. v. Fazal,163 the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts held that the affirmative defense based
on an Indian custody decree of a father charged with kidnap-
ping under the IPKCA, did not warrant a dismissal of the
154 Id. at 128.
155 Id. at 129.
156 Ahmed, 762 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
157 Id. at 128.
158 Id.
159 International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2, 42 U.S.C.A §11601 (1988).
160 See United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 878 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
defendant could not remove children to Egypt for a custody determination for relig-
ious reasons, when mother had full legal custody and children were habitual re-
sidents of the U.S.).
161 See id.
162 See U.S. v. Fazal, 203 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass. 2002).
163 Id. at 35.
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charges.164 This court ruled that the Act was a rational tool for
fulfilling "enforcement gap closing" function. 165 Therefore,
equal protection rights of Indian citizens were not violated by
his indictment under the act, where India was not a Hague sig-
natory.16 6 Irrespective of this protection, courts remain wary of
allowing a parent to leave the country with a child because they
continue to fear that a parent might not return from a non-
Hague nation. Thus, U.S. courts would be left powerless in any
enforcement of a U.S. custody decree.
Under the Hague Convention, U.S. federal courts have the
clear authority to determine the merits of an abduction claim
even if they lack the authority to determine an underlying cus-
tody claim.' 67 In Anderson v. Acree,' 68 the district court for the
Southern District of Ohio ruled on whether a mother had law-
fully removed her daughter from New Zealand, where the fa-
ther had custody rights. 69 The court also decided whether the
father could return the child to New Zealand for further custody
proceedings, as the child's place of habitual residence. 170 The
court argued that it could not rule on the substantive issue of
which parent should be awarded custody.' 7 '
In spite of this declaration, the court found that sufficient
evidence was presented that the child now had greater ties to
her new environment in Ohio with her mother. The court also
concluded that the harm associated with uprooting the child
outweighed any Hague convention considerations. 72 The court
held, however, that its ruling was not a custody determination,
but rather a decision that the substantive custody decision
should be made in the U.S.' 73 Thus, even in some instances
where U.S. courts are dealing with Hague signatory nations,
they are wary of returning them to the hands of a foreign court
if the children have established strong ties to the United States.
164 Id. at 34.
165 Id.
166 Fazal, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 34-35.
167 International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2, supra note 159.
168 Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 876 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
169 Id. at 878.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 879-80.
172 Anderson, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
173 Id.
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In such instances, a federal court will grant jurisdiction to a
state court in the underlying custody dispute. 174 However, in
Hague cases, it is more likely that, despite the fact that a cus-
tody dispute is adjudicated in U.S. court, individual judges are
comfortable in allowing a child to travel to the Hague nation as
part of a custody arrangement. 7 5
Some recent U.S. State court decisions reflect a positive
trend towards equalizing the treatment of Hague and non-
Hague citizens in U.S. custody disputes.' 76 In Abouzahr v.
Matera-Abouzahr,77 the New Jersey Appellate Division re-
jected the attitude of sister courts regarding non-Hague na-
tions. In Abouzahr, the intermediate appellate court
emphasized that there is no absolute prohibition against award-
ing visitation in a non-Hague country. 78 In addition, it cor-
rectly noted that the best interest of a child is not served by a
geographical restraint on visitation especially if a judge finds no
reason to believe that the father would abduct his daughter or
refuse to return her.'7 9 In fact, the court admits that it would
be difficult for the mother to enforce a New Jersey custody de-
cree in Lebanon.180 Additionally, it points out that all countries
in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are not Hague
signatories. 18  Therefore, there is no remedy with any of these
nations after an unlawful abduction.'8 2 However, the judge
also considered the fact that the father had to travel a lot for
business and would be forced to come into contact with a Hague
country at some point, so it would not be in his best interest to
violate the order. l8 3
Thus, even though the court was wary of allowing visitation
to take place in Lebanon, a non-Hague country, it allowed for
visitation assuming fulfillment of an advance notice require-
174 Id. at 884.
175 See, e.g., Charpie, 300 A.D. 2d 143 (where a New York court was hesitant
about a father's intention to return his children from Switzerland to the U.S., but
allowed visitation if he complied with certain precautionary measures).
176 See, e.g., Abouzahr, 824 A.2d 268.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 281.
179 Id. at 277.
180 Id. at 275.
181 Abouzahr, 824 A.2d at 279.
182 Id. at 279.
183 Id. at 278.
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ment concerning visitation. 84 Citing Long, the court stated
that it would not deny visitation to Lebanon merely because
Lebanon was not a Hague signatory.8s5 Although this comes
from the appellate division and not the highest New Jersey
court, it is still an active attempt to reverse the post-September
11th trend of totally eliminating parental access in non-Hague
nations.'8 6 In the end, the New Jersey court seems to apply the
most fair non-Hague rule, stating:
We decline to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting out-of-country
visitation by a parent whose country has not adopted the Hague
Convention or executed an extradition treaty with the United
States. Such a rule would unnecessarily penalize a law-abiding
parent and could conflict with a child's best interest by depriving
the child of an opportunity to share his or her family heritage
with a parent. Moreover, it would mistakenly change the focus
from the parent to whether his or her native country's laws, poli-
cies, religion or values conflict with out own. Such an inflexible
rule would border on xenophobia, a long word with a long and
sinister past.'8 7
Therefore, despite the mother's fear, the court saw no legitimate
reason to deny a child access rights to her father, provided that
four weeks notice be given to determine whether the region was
safe for the child's travel.'8 8
Recently, American courts have become increasingly de-
pendent on the best interest standard in determining all cus-
tody disputes. This policy is seemingly geared toward
reassuring American parents with children involved in custody
disputes with non-Hague signatories that an American court
will not put a custody dispute in the hands of a non-Hague
country that will not have fair custody hearings that rely on the
best interest standard. Therefore, U.S. Courts have, through
their acceptance of jurisdiction even in situations where it is not
clear that America is a child's home state, implicitly found it to
be their duty to hear these disputes in order to protect the
rights of the party who is a U.S. Citizen and protect the Ameri-
184 Id. at 281.
185 Id.
186 Abouzahr, 824 A.2d at 281.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 282.
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can best interest standard, which clearly values different crite-
ria than Islamic nations that refuse to recognize this standard.
Because American judges fear that custody arrangements
with visitation to non-Hague countries are less easily enforcea-
ble, they are extremely liberal in actively restricting a child's
contact with these foreign nations.18 9 These restrictions seem
to arrive even if, the child would likely be seen as a habitual
resident of the foreign country and U.S. courts would abstain
from jurisdiction' 90 with non-Hague disputes when a child is ar-
guably a habitual resident of the U.S., instead of deferring to
the foreign, non-Hague nation, domestic courts bend over back-
wards to find a reason why these cases should be determined
under the American legal system.191 This policy allows the
court to apply the American best interest of the child standard
that is generally not used in custody determinations by non-
Hague, particularly Muslim, courts.1 92
As a result, American judges have been making substan-
tive custody decisions in disputes regarding non-Hague coun-
tries, while they merely make jurisdictional determinations for
custody disputes involving Hague nations. 193 Overall, this ap-
proach creates inconsistent judicial policy.' 94 U.S. courts face
many legitimate fears concerning their inability to protect
American interests in disputes involving non-Hague countries.
However, these courts should strive to retain jurisdiction over
any international custody dispute only where it is clear that
American courts have a reasonable and legitimate claim to
jurisdiction.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., Long, 624 N.W.2d at 408.
192 See id.
193 See, e.g., the court's treatment of the custody dispute in Long, 624 N.W.2d
405, where it was anxious about returning a child to a country that did not follow a
'best interest of the child standard' and which could choose to ignore an American
custody decree, versus the court's treatment of the custody dispute in Wiggill, 262
F. Supp. 687, in which the court merely abstained from US jurisdiction in substan-
tive issues and ordered the case be returned for a decision on the merits to
Germany.
194 See, e.g., id.
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PART IV/CONCLUSION:
Under the Hague Convention, U.S. courts have a clear
guide in making decisions concerning international custody dis-
putes. Some critics argue that policy underlying the Hague
Convention creates judicial decisions that result in purely juris-
dictional rulings rather than consideration of the best interest
of the child. 195 However, regardless of this criticism, it is clear
that the Hague Convention provides strict guidance for U.S.
courts in their ability to make uniform decisions concerning in-
ternational custody disputes. In addition, the Hague Conven-
tion is successful at safeguarding against parents attempting to
forum shop in different Hague countries for favorable custody
decrees.
Despite the success of uniform decisions under the Hague
Convention, the reality remains that roughly three-fourths of
the world's countries are not Hague signatories. 196 Some recent
U.S. court decisions, such as the New Jersey Supreme Court's
holding that allowed visitation in Lebanon, reflect a judicial
trend towards equalizing the treatment of Hague and non-
Hague citizens in custody disputes involving an American par-
ent. 1 97 Even if American courts are wary of declining jurisdic-
tion in favor of non-Hague countries applying their laws, this
approach of fair custody dispute resolution should be applied
across U.S. jurisdictions, with judicial energy spent seeking
safeguards for enforcement rather than in denying interna-
tional visitation where it is warranted.
Since September 11th, American judges might have cor-
rectly discerned that the only way to safeguard the rights of
American citizens involved in international non-Hague custody
disputes, is to adjudicate these cases in American courts. Re-
gardless of whether or not this attitude is correct, American
courts should follow New Jersey's lead. Even in deciding the
merits of a custody dispute with a non-Hague signatory such as
Lebanon, a court should not have the freedom, just because
these nations are non-Hague signatories, to outright reject visi-
tation in non-Hague countries. 98 This policy of outright rejec-
195 Starr, supra note 135.
196 Id. at 793.
197 Abouzahr, 824 A.2d 268.
198 See id.
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tion clearly does not reflect the American value and standard of
considering what is in the best interest of the child in determin-
ing how a child should spend time with each of her parents.
Rather, American judges must be creative in their decision-
making concerning visitation to non-Hague signatories so the
true best interest of each child can be achieved through the
American judicial process.
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